Industrial designer Phil Straus began thinking of ways to lessen the impact of football head injuries and concussions in the late 1980s. After several years of work Straus developed a prototype of the “ProCap” in 1989 by attaching a half-inch-thick urethane mold on top of traditional football helmets. His work showed signs of promise in lab tests, and later gained acceptance by a number of NFL players who swore that the invention functioned as advertised. Mark Kelso, former Buffalo Bills free safety, swore by the ProCap, stating “It prolonged my career for years . . . I took a lot of kidding – getting called ‘Bubblehead’ and ‘Gazoo’ – because of how it looked, but I stopped getting concussions.” Over the next several years, several other NFL players began using the ProCap, and scientific studies indicated that the design had significant promise.
However, the NFL’s concussion committee took a hard line stance against the product in 1995, insisting that the ProCap failed to address several player safety issues. In June of 1996, it circulated a memo to NFL players indicating that ProCap users risked “catastrophic neck injuries, including possible death.” As expected, teams like the Kansas City Chiefs began forbidding their players from wearing it.
What makes the story so interesting is the fact that scientific evidence rebuffed the NFL’s stance on the ProCap. Richard Nelson, a researcher at Pennsylvania State University’s Biomechanics Laboratory who studied the ProCap, stated, “It’s my opinion that the ProCap should be mandatory for all football players.” Commenting on the NFL’s strong stance against Straus’ product, Nelson noted, “It’s incredible such a conclusion can be drawn when, in fact, the results show the exact opposite.”
This is an interesting development for the ongoing concussion litigation – a class-action lawsuit brought by thousands of former players who accuse the NFL and helmet manufacturer Riddell, Inc. of downplaying the risks of concussions and head injuries on long-term cognitive decline. Given the NFL’s exclusive contractual relationship with Riddell for the manufacturing of its helmets, the League had every incentive to discredit Riddell’s potential competitors, regardless of what science said was true. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that this isn’t the first time the League has gone out of its way to stifle helmet development by non-Riddell entities – the NFL also publicly discredited a new lightweight helmet design by the Bike Athletic Co. in 1999. Additionally, the exclusive contractual relationship gave Riddell a reason to exaggerate the safety of its own helmet gear – exaggerations which are now under scrutiny in this case.
However the information above is used, it seems likely that both the NFL and Riddell will have some explaining to do regarding player helmets if the litigation survives its infancy. The class-action is currently awaiting a decision on a motion to dismiss filed by the defendants (which asserts that, as the dispute is strictly a player safety issue, it arises under the player’s collective bargaining agreement and must be submitted to arbitration).